Which dimensions of social responsibility concern financial investors? by Girerd-Potin, I. et al.
Which dimensions of social responsibility concern
financial investors?
I. Girerd-Potin, Sonia Jimenez-Garce`s, P. Louvet
To cite this version:
I. Girerd-Potin, Sonia Jimenez-Garce`s, P. Louvet. Which dimensions of social responsibility
concern financial investors?. Cahiers de Recherche du CERAG n 2012-01 E2. 2012, 37 p.
<halshs-00679629>
HAL Id: halshs-00679629
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00679629
Submitted on 16 Mar 2012
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which dimensions of social responsibility concern financial 
investors? 
 
GIRERD-POTIN Isabelle,  JIMENEZ-GARCES Sonia, LOUVET Pascal 
February 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CAHIER DE RECHERCHE n°2012- E2 
Unité Mixte de Recherche CNRS / Université Pierre Mendès France Grenoble 2 
150 rue de la Chimie – BP 47 – 38040 GRENOBLE cedex 9 
Tél. : 04 76 63 53 81    Fax : 04 76 54 60 68  
2 
 
Which dimensions of social responsibility concern 
financial investors? 
Girerd-Potin Isabelle*, Jimenez-Garcès Sonia**, Louvet Pascal*** 
February, 2012 
Abstract 
Social and environmental ratings provided by social rating agencies are multidimensional. 
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(stockholders and debt holders).We explore the link between stock returns and these three SR 
dimensions. Our main result is that, for each SR dimension, investors ask for an additional 
risk premium when they decide to hold non SR stocks. The cost of equity is thus lower for 
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component “indirect stakeholders”.  For this last component, the premium obviously exists 
only since the end of 2008. Environment and community involvement have only recently 
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1.  Introduction1 
Since the emergence of the issue of firm social responsibility (SR), the link between stock 
returns and socially responsible investment (SRI) has been studied in academic literature. 
Theoretically, this link can be positive or negative. It can be positive either because socially 
responsible firms are seen as more risky than other firms, or because there is a temporary 
efficiency anomaly. This anomaly can be explained either by increasing investor demand for 
social stocks, or by investor myopia preventing prices to fully reflect the SR benefits. 
Conversely, the return of socially responsible firms can be less than the return of non SR 
firms if SR firms are seen as less risky than others, or if investors are not motivated purely by 
financial returns and accept a financial sacrifice to “improve the world”.  
The empirical results concerning the link between SRI and financial performance are mixed 
and depend on performance measures, countries, periods, assets or portfolios. The literature 
has recently moved towards examination of the main dimensions of SRI. The underlying 
intuition is that the relationship between SRI components2 and stock returns is not necessarily 
uniform. We focus on this literature about sub-ratings and their link with financial 
performance and equity market value.  
A first series of tests examine the relationship between social scores and equity returns. 
Galema et al. (2008) form portfolios based on individual KLD rating agency criteria. Most 
empirical tests use the ratings provided by KLD and are split into seven themes: community 
involvement, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, product, and 
human rights (the last one being considered since 2000). Adjusting for risk in a Carhart 
model, Galema et al. find no significant abnormal return difference between portfolios built 
                                                           
1
 We are grateful to the Vigeo social rating agency for their generosity in providing the ratings they produce. 
2
 The SRI components are dimensions of social responsibility like, for instance, environment, firm relationships 
with clients and suppliers, or respect for human rights. These dimensions are estimated by rating agencies and 
give rise to “sub-ratings”. A global firm SR rating is a combination of its sub-ratings. 
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on each of the six dimensions, apart from the community involvement dimension (which 
shows positive abnormal returns for high scores). Using cross-sectional regressions on 
individual stocks, the authors carry out a regression of the stock excess returns on the six sub-
ratings, the stock’s beta and some control variables. The employee relations score is the only 
one to have a significant positive effect on excess returns. Statman and Glushkov (2009) show 
similar results. They build portfolios with increasing SR scores for the period 1992-2007 and 
obtain significantly positive returns for long short portfolios when the SR criterion is 
employee relations or community involvement. For employee relations, significant results 
only appear on the first sub-period (1992-1999). Conversely, the human rights score is not 
significant for the whole period but is significantly negative for the second sub period (2000-
2007). With the same ratings and almost the same period (1992-2009) Gregory et al. (2010) 
see no significant link between stock returns and social ratings. Brammer et al. (2006), using 
scores provided by EIRIS (Ethical Investment Research Service) updated and available in 
July 2002, show that the UK companies with higher social performance scores tend to achieve 
lower returns. On disaggregate data, they observe that the environmental and community 
involvement indicators are negatively correlated with returns while the employment indicator 
is weakly positively related.  
Nelling and Webb (2009) reexamine the “virtuous circle” between corporate social 
responsibility and financial performance using a fixed effects Granger causality approach. 
The question they address is the following. Does the social behavior of a firm have an impact 
on its stock returns or is it the contrary? Over the period 1993-2000, there is no evidence that 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) as measured by KLD scores affected firm financial 
performance. Higher stock returns led to higher employee relations scores. For other aspects 
of CSR, there is no evidence of causality between stock returns and CSR.  
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The link between social scores and financial returns has probably changed over the last 
several years. The point of interest for companies and investors in the future will be to 
forecast the cost of equity in relation with present social ratings.  ElGhoul et al. (2011), on a 
sample of US firms, find that firms with higher CSR ratings exhibit significantly lower 
implied cost of equity capital. The implied cost of equity is an ex-ante measure coming from 
different discounted cash flow models, with data provided by IBES. Furthermore, they find 
that on the six dimensions of KLD social performance, only three are related to the cost of 
equity. Employee relations, environmental policies, and product strategy dimensions are 
negatively related to this cost. The results have to be cautiously interpreted, given that they 
rely on analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Some papers are devoted to only one SR dimension, especially environment or employee 
relations. Edmans (2011) finds that firms with a high level of employee satisfaction (firms 
belonging to the 100 Best Companies to Work for in America) earned an annual abnormal 
return of 3.5% from 1984 to 2009. He interprets his findings as a market failure to fully 
incorporate intangible assets into stock valuations, even if, all things being equal, these firms 
exhibit greater market values (as measured by the market-to-book ratio, the price-to-earnings 
ratio and the ratio of aggregate value to EBITDA). The market is at least partially valuing the 
intangibles.  
Instead of a dynamic analysis on stock returns, some articles try to find a link between the 
market value of equity and social scores. Does the value creation of a firm depend on its 
social scores? To answer this question, one first needs a good measure of value creation, and, 
second, to identify all other variables impacting value creation (sector, size, growth…). Bird 
et al. (2007) use the KLD ratings issued during the period from 1991 to 2003 for US 
companies and suggest the CSR activities valued by the market vary over time. It seems that 
returns and valuation multiples (market-to-book and price-to-earnings) are positively linked to 
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diversity and employee strengths. On the contrary, there is a conflict between community 
strengths and market valuation. The same thing is observed for firms with a high 
environmental strength score. Galema et al. (2008) investigate the impact of KLD scores on 
the book-to-market ratio, proxying for equity market value over the period 1992-2006. The 
link is negative, except for the governance score which has a significantly positive effect on 
book-to-market. Gregory et al. (2010) show that high levels of KLD sub-ratings during the 
years 1992-2009 are related to high stock values, in particular diversity, employee relations 
and environment. The market rewards CSR, indicating that these firms have a lower cost of 
capital and/or greater expected cash-flows than their counterparts. 
Semenova et al. (2010) investigate the value relevance of environmental and social 
performance ratings for the market values of companies listed on the OMX Stockholm. They 
use the GES Investment Services risk rating for Swedish companies belonging to the SIX 300 
Index for the period 2005-2008. The estimated dimensions are environmental and social 
components of SR. Three sub-dimensions are rated inside the social dimension: employees, 
community, and suppliers. The environmental index is positively related to the market value 
of equity. The relation between the global social index and the market value is significantly 
negative. Regarding the social sub-dimensions, the relation is negative with employees but 
positive with community and suppliers. Marsat and Williams (2011) use MSCI ESG ratings 
(formerly Innovest) over the period 2005-2009 and observe a negative impact of responsible 
behavior on corporate market value. They use Tobin’s Q and price-to-book ratio to proxy 
equity valuation. The negative relation between the market value and the CSR score is 
observed both on the global rating and on the four sub-ratings (environment, human capital, 
strategic governance, stakeholder capital). Either the market considers SR firms bear more 
costs or the advantages to being SR are not yet fully reflected in stock prices.  
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Some articles focus on environmental impact on market value. Dowell et al. (2000) find that 
higher market value (as measured by Tobin’s Q) is associated with the adoption of a single 
stringent environmental standard around the world. Several interpretations are proposed: low 
environmental quality creates a bad image and potential liabilities, adopting high 
environmental standards increases productivity thanks to latest technologies and may be an 
indicator of firm quality. 
Guenster et al. (2011) examine the link between corporate eco-efficiency and either an 
accounting performance measure (return on assets) or a financial performance one (Tobin’s 
Q). Eco-efficiency scores come from Innovest (monthly scores for the period 1996-2004) and 
reflect both past and future firm environmental behavior. Eco-efficiency is defined as “the 
ability to create more value while using fewer environmental resources, such as water, air, oil, 
coal and other limited natural endowments”.  The authors find a positive relation between 
eco-efficiency and return on assets as well as with market value. The valuation differential 
between the most eco-efficient firms and the least eco-efficient firms is time-varying and has 
increased over the period. This result favors an efficiency anomaly, environmental 
information being gradually incorporated into the stock price. 
Fernando et al. (2009), using KLD environmental measures over the period 1996-2007, show 
that both green and toxic firms have lower Tobin’s Q values than do environmentally neutral 
firms. They find no significant abnormal returns for firms in green and toxic industries.  
The results about value and social responsibility do not converge. It could be due to the weak 
impact of social responsibility on market value as compared to the other determinants of 
value. Even with a meticulous methodology it is hard to isolate the social impact. Moreover, 
if the market is at equilibrium and shareholders and managers rationally have the same goal of 
maximizing the firm value, the market-to-book ratio must be identical for all companies in a 
given sector. The reason is that, in a given sector, costs are similar to reach the same social 
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commitment and, at equilibrium, no firm will take advantage of a change in its social status to 
become more or less socially responsible. As shown by Dupré et al. (2009), the lower cost of 
capital for SR firms (due to lower risk or stockholder altruism) will be compensated by the 
higher costs they incur and their lower expected cash-flows. It could be expected that, over 
long periods, empirical tests studying the relation between equity and social responsibility 
(especially when SR is valued by comparison between firms belonging to the same sector) 
will show only one thing: a lower return for socially responsible stocks. 
Another group of articles adopt a totally different approach, focusing on stock returns over a 
few days around a CSR-related event. Drusch and Lioui (2010) present an event study on 148 
CSR-related events for 31 firms on the French market between 2003 and 2009. At the 
aggregate level, CSR has a positive but not statistically significant impact on stock returns. 
Six dimensions are considered. Two yield a significant positive reaction (social integration 
and help for suburbs). The others show non-significantly negative or positive reactions 
(environmental protection, health care, sports, entry/exit from an index).  
Our paper relies on the Vigeo ratings. Very few studies are available using this database as 
compared to the KLD one. Articles based on the Vigeo ratings mainly concern European 
firms. The rating methodologies are different. Vigeo values six dimensions: human resources, 
environment, corporate governance, community involvement, business behavior, and human 
rights (see Appendix 1). The score is relative inside a sector and for a date. The results may be 
different from that which was obtained on US firms using KLD scores. One previous study on 
Vigeo sub-scores is the Cellier et al. (2011) event study. They measure the impact of Vigeo 
score announcements on the European stock market over the period 2004-2009. They find 
that market reaction to the global score announcement is positive regardless the rating (good 
news or bad news). They make a regression of the cumulative abnormal returns around the 
announcement on the Vigeo rating or sub-ratings as well as on some control variables. It 
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appears that the aggregated score has no impact, the Human rights sub-score has a positive 
influence, and the Environment and Human resources have a negative one.  
The goal of our paper is twofold. First, we want to identify the different dimensions of social 
responsibility. Before considering the link between the dimensions of SRI and financial 
returns, we carry out an exploratory analysis on the six Vigeo SR dimensions. A better 
understanding of these dimensions will help us interpret the nature of their relation with 
returns. Using the six sub-ratings provided by the Vigeo rating agency, we perform a principal 
component analysis and we highlight three main SR dimensions related to (1) the direct non-
financial stakeholders (employee, customers and suppliers), (2) the indirect stakeholders 
(environment and society) and (3) the financial stakeholders (stockholders and debt holders). 
The second part of the paper is devoted to exploring the link between stock returns and SR 
dimensions. In this part, we use a Fama and French (1993) approach with risk premiums 
associated with each of the three new social dimensions we have put forward in our principal 
component analysis. The main results of this section are that being non-socially responsible in 
one or several of the three dimensions is compensated by significant risk premiums in the 
market. The average premiums over the period 2003-2010 are larger for the components 
“direct non-financial stakeholders” and “financial stakeholders” than for the component 
“indirect stakeholders”.  For this last component, the premium obviously exists only since the 
end of 2008. Environment and community involvement have only recently become a more 
important risk factor in investors’ minds. About the former risk premia (“direct non-financial 
stakeholders” and “financial stakeholders”), investors appear to penalize firms with the worst 
behavior in respect to their direct non-financial stakeholders and reward firms with good 
corporate governance practices.  
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Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data and our methodology for 
extracting three independent dimensions from the social performance. Section 3 is devoted to 
empirically studying the impact of social performance on financial performance. We first 
construct, along the same lines as Fama and French (1993), a risk premium linked to each of 
the three social dimensions put forward in Section 2. We then add these three social risk 
premia to the traditional market, size and book-to-market premia in a Fama and French (1993) 
setting, and we test this new empirical model. The last section contains our conclusions. 
2.  The Dimensions of Social Performance 
 2.1 Data 
Our data set consists of the monthly social ratings of 816 firms followed by the Vigeo rating 
agency between December 2003 and November 2010. The SR valuation embed six different 
ratings concerning different aspects of social commitment: Human Resources (HR), 
Environment (ENV), Business Behavior (BB), Corporate Governance (CG), Community 
Involvement (CIN), and Human Rights (HRts). Each of these ratings ranges from 0 for less 
socially responsible firms to +4 for more socially responsible ones. The different criteria 
evaluated by Vigeo for establishing the social ratings, as well as our methodology for 
constructing a global rating based on these six sub-ratings are explained in Appendix 1.  
Book-to-market ratios as well as market values, necessary for our Fama and French (1993) 
based empirical methodology come from Datastream.  
We note that the number of rated stocks changes on a monthly basis over the period under 
consideration. For instance, data concerning each of the six social ratings is available for 43 
firms in December 2003, 306 in December 2004, 525 in December 2005, 577 in December 
2006, 631 in December 2007, 685 in December 2008, 787 in December 2009 and 816 in 
December 2010. This represents a total of 816 different firms rated over the period we 
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consider. Accounting and financial data is converted into Euros using the relevant exchange 
rate at the end of each financial year.  
Table 1, Panel A presents some descriptive statistics on the six social sub-ratings produced by 
Vigeo as well as on the global rating summarizing the six sub-ratings (see Appendix 1). All 
sub-ratings present a same distribution with an average around 2, the middle of the scale, and 
with a high dispersion (standard deviation is near 1).  
Table 1 Panel A 
Descriptive Statistics on the Social Variables 
This table presents some descriptive statistics (average, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum) for 
the six social sub-ratings produced by Vigeo as well as on the global rating summarizing the six sub-ratings.  
 Global Rating HR 
rating 
ENV 
rating 
C&S 
rating 
CG 
rating 
CIN 
rating 
HRts 
rating 
Average 1.90 1.97 1.98 1.98 1.97 1.98 1.97 
Median 1.93 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Standard 
deviation 
.71 .93 .96 .92 .95 .94 .95 
Minimum 0.12 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 3.82 4 4 4 4 4 4 
 
Table 1 Panel B presents some descriptive statistics for the financial variables: the stocks 
excess returns on the risk free rate, the market risk premium, the stock market values, the 
stocks’ book-to-market values. 
Table 1 Panel B 
Descriptive Statistics on the Financial Variables 
This table presents some descriptive statistics (average, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum) for 
the financial variables (the stock excess return over the risk-free rate, the market risk premium, the firm market 
value, the firm book-to-market value). 
 
Excess 
Return 
Market Risk 
Premium 
Market Value  
in K€ 
Book-to-
Market 
Average .0034 -.0006 11,221.75 .6129 
Median .0009 .0073 4,523.84 .4808 
Standard deviation .1026 .0524 18,809.03 .9381 
Minimum -.99 -.16 3.06 -25.00 
Maximum 2.29 .15 207,385.03 33.33 
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2.2 The three main dimensions of social responsibility 
Social responsibility is an extensive concept which can be measured by a lot of criteria. In the 
Vigeo methodology, six sub-criteria are retained. Each one is supposed to characterize a 
specific dimension of social responsibility according to the stakeholder approach: debt- and 
stockholders, employees, clients and suppliers, environment, society, and humanity. We can 
ask if these dimensions are all relevant for the financial market. Before answering this 
question, it might be useful to analyze the information given by each sub-criterion. Are the six 
dimensions necessary to describe the complexity of social responsibility? Are some of them 
redundant? Is it possible to synthesize all of them in a reduced number of components?   
The correlation matrix presented in Table 2 reveals that sub-ratings are not mutually 
independent. Correlation reaches a maximum of 0.647 between Human Rights and Human 
Resources; Environment exhibits a strong link with Human Resources and Community 
Involvement. Conversely, correlation is weaker between Corporate Governance and the other 
sub-criteria. Corporate Governance is also the sub-rating which is the least linked to the 
global social rating.  
Table 2  
Correlation matrix of the six sub-ratings and the global rating 
This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients of the six sub-ratings and the global rating. *, **, *** 
respectively indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
Rating 
Global 
Rating 
Human 
Resources 
Environ- 
ment 
Clients & 
Suppliers 
Corporate 
Governance 
Community 
Involvement 
Human 
Rights 
Global Rating 1       
Human Resources .771*** 1      
Environment .796*** .567*** 1     
Clients & Suppliers .789*** .557*** .562*** 1    
Corporate Governance .553*** .205*** .324*** .319*** 1   
Community Involvement .753*** .485*** .563*** .517*** .302*** 1  
Human Rights .792*** .647*** .541*** .589*** .297*** .511*** 1 
 
According to the previous analysis, the high correlation between each sub-criterion and the 
global rating suggests that the information can be summarized in fewer dimensions.  A 
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principal components analysis (PCA, hereafter) can be applied to extract the relevant and 
independent dimensions.  
The PCA is run on the whole sample during the entire period. Noting XJi,t the criterion J score 
for the firm i at time t, the data matrix for the analysis is organized as follows: 
















...6...
......
......
....2...
...1...
.
,
,
,
ti
ti
ti
X
X
X
 
In Table 3, we show that the first component has an Eigen value of 3.4 and accounts for about 
57% of the total variance. It’s clearly the main factor. The second and third components 
respectively explain 14% and 9% of the total variance and can possibly be retained to improve 
the representation of the SR diversity. Together, these three components explain 80% of the 
total variance. The other components can be neglected.  
Table 3 
Eigen values of the Principal Component Analysis 
This table presents the Eigen values of each component of the PCA  
as well as the percentage of the total variance which is  
accounted for by each component. 
Component Initial 
Eigen 
values 
% 
Variance 
Cumulated 
Variance 
1 3.431 57.186 57.186 
2 .851 14.183 71.369 
3 .542 9.035 80.405 
4 .428 7.128 87.533 
5 .419 6.987 94.520 
6 .329 5.480 100.000 
 
All the sub-ratings contribute highly and equally to the first Component except the Corporate 
Governance one which is concentrated in the second component (see Appendix 2 for a 
detailed analysis of those factors). As it explains 9% of the total variance, we decide to also 
retain the third component in the next development. To facilitate the factor interpretation, we 
apply a Varimax rotation on the retained components. Table 4, Panel A presents the 
14 
 
correlations between the rotated components (noted C1, C2 and C3), and the initial sub-
ratings. Regarding those correlations, we can associate C1 with Human Resources, Business 
Behavior and Human Rights sub-ratings and we can refer (for this component) to the “direct 
non financial stakeholders”. Employees, clients and suppliers can be called “direct 
stakeholders” because they are linked to the firm by a contract. Human Rights are logically 
associated with the direct stakeholders because it refers to the way a firm is concerned by 
human rights in its relation with its employees3. The association of the direct non financial 
stakeholders in a same component suggests that the way a firm behaves towards its partners is 
the same regardless of the counterpart: when a firm is concerned for its employees, it tends to 
consider its clients and suppliers in the same way.  As this component explains 57% of the 
variance, we can state that firms differ mainly in the way they deal with their non financial 
stakeholders. The second component, which is the most highly correlated with the 
Environment and Community Involvement sub-ratings, can be interpreted as social 
responsibility towards society, what we call “indirect stakeholders”. The relationship between 
a firm and the environment or the community is not regulated by a specific and explicit 
contract but by general law and implicit social pressure. Finally, the third component is most 
highly correlated with the Corporate Governance sub-rating and reflects social responsibility 
to financial stakeholders. This confirms our intuition that Corporate Governance is a specific 
and independent dimension of social responsibility4. Those results seem to indicate that firms 
distinguish three main and independent targets in their SR policy: the direct non financial 
                                                           
3
 As mentioned by Vigeo, the human rights rating deals with respect for freedom of association, the right to 
collective bargaining, non-discrimination and promotion of equality, elimination of illegal working practices 
such as child or forced labor, prevention of inhumane or degrading treatment such as sexual harassment, 
protection of privacy and personal data. 
4
 We also run the Varimax rotation only on C1 and C2. The first rotated component aggregates the 5 non 
financial sub-ratings and the second one reflects only the Corporate Governance dimension. Comparing both 
rotations, we can observe that increasing the number of components allows splitting the first “non financial 
stakeholders” component into two parts: the main one which considers only the direct non financial stakeholders 
and a second one which considers the indirect stakeholders.  
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stakeholders (employees, clients and suppliers), the indirect ones (environment and society) 
and the financial ones (debt holders and stockholders).  
Table 4 Panel A 
Rotated Component Matrix 
This table presents the correlations between the rotated components (noted C1, C2 and C3), and 
the initial sub-ratings. The higher correlations are identified by bold characters. 
 Rating Components 
C1 C2 C3 
HR rating .846 .278 .001 
ENV rating .497 .650 .190 
BB rating .681 .392 .227 
CG rating .135 .159 .971 
CIN rating .266 .897 .124 
HRts rating .839 .221 .165 
Explained Variance  57.18% 14.18% 9.04% 
Concern Direct non financial 
stakeholders: 
Employees, Clients 
and Suppliers 
Indirect 
stakeholders: 
Environment and 
Society 
Financial 
stakeholders: 
Stockholders and 
Debt holders 
 
 
We present in Table 4, Panel B the component score coefficients used to compute the value of 
our three new components C1, C2 and C3. For each component, the sign of the coefficient is 
such that more responsible a firm is, the higher its score. According to the correlation 
analysis, when a sub-rating can be associated to a component, its coefficient is positive; 
inversely, if it cannot, its coefficient is negative. To test the validity of the score functions, the 
PCA is run again on two equal sub-periods (cf. columns 2 and 3). The results are similar and 
prove the robustness of the analysis: each coefficient keeps a same sign and has a close level.  
Finally, Table 4, Panel C presents some descriptive statistics for the three components which 
will be considered in the next section dealing with financial performance. The components 
seem to have a same distribution: we can thus compare the score calculated on each 
component. As the sum of function coefficients is inferior to 1, the average score is under the 
median score of each sub-rating (around 1.5 instead of 2). 
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Table 4 Panel B 
Component Rating Coefficient Matrix 
This table presents the component score coefficients used to compute the value of our three new components C1, 
C2 and C3. For each component, we present the rating coefficients from the analysis applied on the whole period 
(column 2), then on two equal sub-periods (columns 3 and 4). In the last column we also present the difference 
between the coefficients obtained for each sub-period. 
Sub-rating Whole period 
First 
sub-period 
December 
2003- May 
2007 
 
Second 
sub-period 
June 2007- 
November 
2010 
Difference 
between sub-
periods 
Component C1 
Human Resources .547 .647 .493 .0055 
Environment -.033 -.186 .005 -.191 
Clients & Suppliers .298 .231 .324 -.093 
Corporate Governance -.108 -.121 -.098 -.023 
Community Involvement 
-.395 -.367 -.389 .022 
Human Rights .561 .590 .562 .028 
Component C2 
Human Resources 
-.213 -.299 -.141 -.158 
Environment .461 .586 .43 .156 
Clients & Suppliers -.013 .105 -.063 .168 
Corporate Governance -.154 -.168 -.143 -.025 
Community Involvement .961 .840 .972 -.132 
Human Rights -.329 -.285 -.359 .074 
Component C3 
Human Resources -.178 -.123 -.214 .091 
Environment -.027 -.034 -.027 -.007 
Clients & Suppliers .064 .004 .094 -.09 
Corporate Governance 1.034 1,068 1,012 .056 
Community Involvement -.142 -.152 -.128 -.024 
Human Rights .023 -.011 .042 -.053 
 
Table 4 Panel C 
Descriptive Statistics on the three components of Social Performance 
This table presents some descriptive statistics (average, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum) for 
the value of the three components (C1, C2, C3). 
 C1 C2 C3 
Average 1.7170 1.4194 1.5295 
Median 1.7402 1.3681 1.5189 
Standard Deviation .9418 .9499 .9578 
Minimum -1.03 -1.39 -1.05 
Maximum 4.74 4.60 3.99 
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3.  Social Performance Impact on Financial returns 
In this section, we study the impact of each one of the three dimensions of social performance 
on financial performance. Firms that do not consider ethical and socially responsible 
investments are seen as more risky5. Investors should thus ask for an additional risk premium 
when they decide to hold non SR stocks. Hereafter, we precisely test the existence of this risk 
premium and ask the following question. Are all three dimensions of social responsibility put 
forward in the previous section associated with a risk premium? 
We first construct, in the same vein as Fama and French (1993), a “non social” risk premium 
factor, called NMR (the return of non-socially responsible firms minus the return of socially 
responsible firms), for each of the three dimensions of social performance put forward in 
section 2.2. These NMR1, NMR2 and NMR3 factors are orthogonalized against the size and 
book-to-market dimensions, following the Fama and French (1993) methodology.  
More precisely, we use the following steps to construct portfolios based on size, book to 
market and social responsibility. 
1- Each month, the stocks in our sample are split into two groups according to their size. 
The stocks with a size smaller than the median are in the small (S) group. The stocks 
with a size larger than the median are in the big (B) group. 
2- Independent of size classification, we split the stocks in our sample into three groups 
based on their book-to-market ratio. Stocks with a book-to-market ratio amongst the 
30% lowest book-to-market ratios will form the L (Low book-to-market) group. 
Stocks with a book-to-market ratio falling in the group with the 30% highest book-to-
market ratios will form the H (High book-to-market) group. The other stocks make up 
the M (Median book-to-market) group. 
                                                           
5
 Investors are aware that society at large produces socially responsible rules which can affect the firms’ returns. 
Increasing individuals sensitivity to social responsibility makes it more difficult for non-socially responsible 
firms to avoid vindictive actions such as boycotts, for instance. 
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3- Stocks are then classified according to their social performance. SR performance is 
appraised successively by the value of the first social component (C1), the second 
social component (C2), and the third social component (C3). Stocks with a social 
performance belonging to the lowest 30% will form the N (Non-socially responsible) 
group. Stocks with a social performance belonging to the highest 30% will form the R 
(socially Responsible) group. The other stocks will form the I (In-between) group. 
We then obtain 18 portfolios for each of the three social dimensions, thus a total of 54 
portfolios. Each portfolio includes all the firms belonging to the same size, book-to-
market and social responsibility levels. Below is a table explaining the splitting for 
each criterion.  
Criteria Size Book-to-Market 
Social Responsibility 
(appraised with the 
first, second or third 
SR dimension)  
1st group 
S 
(Small size firms – 
50% of the firms) 
H 
(High book-to-
market firms – 30% 
of the firms) 
N 
(Non-socially 
responsible firms – 
30% of the firms) 
2nd group  
M 
(Median book-to-
market firms– 40% 
of the firms) 
I 
(In-between firms – 
40% of the firms) 
3rd group 
B 
(Big size firms– 
50% of the firms) 
L 
(Low book-to-
market firms – 30% 
of the firms) 
R 
(socially Responsible 
firms – 30% of the 
firms) 
 
The monthly return of each portfolio is computed as a weighted average of the return of the 
stocks belonging to this portfolio during the considered month. The weights are the market 
values at the beginning of the month. This methodology allows us to construct three risk 
premia: NMR1, NMR2 and NMR3.  
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NMR1 (resp. NMR2, NMR3) corresponds to the return of the less SR firms’ portfolio minus 
the return of the more SR firms’ portfolio, social commitment being measured by the first 
(respectively second, third) component of social performance, C1 (respectively C2, C3). 
NMR1, NMR2, and NMR3 are computed as follows. 
( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 11 11 ... ...6 6t t t t t tt SHN SMN BLN SHR SMR BLRNMR R R R R R R   = + + + − + + +        
( ) ( )2 2 2 2 2 21 12 ... ...6 6t t t t t tt SHN SMN BLN SHR SMR BLRNMR R R R R R R   = + + + − + + +        
( ) ( )3 3 3 3 3 31 13 ... ...6 6t t t t t tt SHN SMN BLN SHR SMR BLRNMR R R R R R R   = + + + − + + +        
Where 1tSHNR is the return weighted average of the stocks belonging to the Small/High book-
to-market/Non-socially responsible group, social responsibility being measured with the first 
component C1. The same definition applies to the 53 other average returns involved in the 
three equations above. 
We propose a deep study of the Non-social risk premia NMR1, NMR2 and NMR3, in section 
3.1 below. In section 3.2 we then analyze the impact of these risk premia on the return of the 
54 portfolios presented above, based on size, book-to-market and social responsibility. 
 3.1 The “Non Social” Risk Premia  
In this section, we analyze the level and the evolution of the social responsibility premium we 
previously proposed following Fama and French (1993). This premium measures the rate of 
return difference between two portfolios, the first being composed of non-socially responsible 
firms and the second consisting of socially responsible firms. This premium is hereafter called 
the “Non social” risk premium. Indeed, it measures the rate of return sacrificed by an investor 
to protect its portfolio against the risk faced by non SR firms. 
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Figure 1, Panel A shows the evolution of the cumulative non social risk premium when it is 
calculated by referring to the global rating6. While the Dow-Jones index is particularly erratic 
during the period under study, the cumulative non-social risk premium increases regularly. At 
the end of the seven year period, the non-socially responsible portfolio out-performs the 
socially responsible one by 15%. Exceptionally, during 2008, the non social risk premium fell 
by 10% but easily withstood the crash.  
Figure 1 Panel A 
Evolution of the NMR premium for the global rating 
This graph presents the cumulative monthly return of the NMR premium calculated following the Fama-French 
(1993) model extended to the SR global rating. For comparison purposes, the Dow Jones Eurostoxx index 
cumulated return is also presented. 
 
We run the Fama-French Model extended to the SR–rating defined by components C1, C2 
and C3 of the previous analysis. Results are reported in Table 5. The three SR average risk 
premia are significantly positive. They are higher for the components C1 (non financial 
stakeholders) and C3 (financial stakeholders) than for C2 (indirect stakeholders). 
                                                           
6
 The same methodology as that presented at the beginning of section 3 was carried out to construct a NMR risk 
premium based on the global rating, instead of on C1, C2 or C3 components (Appendix 1 presents the global 
rating computation).  
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Simultaneously, the average SMB and HML risk premia are paradoxically negative on our 
European dataset7. SMB and HML risk premium also appear to be negative when these 
premia are constructed without considering social responsibility issues (i.e. we consider the 
six portfolios only based on size and book-to-market dimensions). One explanation could be 
that the SR criterion is partially correlated with size and book-to-market. 
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics on the Extended Fama-French monthly risk premia 
The Fama-French methodology is employed for the three alternative specifications of the social rating. Each 
specification is based on a component (C1, C2 or C3) of the principal components analysis. Market risk premium 
(column 2) is the same regardless of SR specification. The NMR, SMB and HML risk premia in the following 
columns are reported for each specification. SMB and HML are slightly different because of the portfolio 
construction. All average premia differ significantly from 0 at the 0.1% level. 
SR Component  Market C1 C2 C3 
Monthly premia rm_rf NMR SMB HML NMR SMB HML NMR SMB HML 
Average ..03% ..35% -..68% -1.75% ..20% -..74% -1.68% ..35% -..75% -1.82% 
Median ..85% ..24% -..56% -1.09% ..12% -..65% -1.08% ..08% -..66% -1.18% 
Standard Deviation 5.03% 1.43% 2.28% 4.55% 1.35% 2.27% 4.49% 1.95% 2.27% 4.56% 
Minimum -16.30% -3.19% -8.34% -19.24% -4.08% -6.70% -19.63% -3.24% -1..28% -19.71% 
Maximum 14.84% 5.31% 7.64% 18.03% 3.41% 7.56% 17.10% 9.34% 7.06% 17.18% 
 
Figure 1, Panel B shows the evolution of the SR risk premium (NMR) based on each 
component. The NMR risk premia based on C1 and C3 increase regularly from the beginning 
of the period, while the increase of C2 is obvious only from the end of 20088. SR concerns of 
financial investors initially only dealt with the way firms manage their relationship with their 
direct stakeholders. Environmental and community involvement have only recently become a  
risk factor in investors’ minds. 
 
                                                           
7
 In the USA Market (CRSP data), SMB and HML monthly risk premia are positive during the same period (they 
are however negative in more recent periods). The average level of those premia, during our analysis period, 
calculated with Kenneth French data (see 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html), are 0.16% for SMB and 0.26% for 
HML. 
8
 The evolutions of the NMR premia based on each one of the 6 sub-ratings proposed by Vigeo are presented in 
Appendix 2. 
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Figure 1 Panel B  
Evolution of NMR premia for the three SR components  
This graph presents the cumulative monthly return of the calculated NMR factor based on the Fama-French 
methodology extended to SR components C1, C2 or C3. . 
 
 
In Table 5, the SR risk premia are less volatile (their standard deviation is around 1.5%) than 
the Market risk (5%), SMB (2.3%) and HML (4.5%) factors. Two conclusions can be inferred 
from this result. First, the evidence is stronger for the SR risk premium than for the other 
ones: the SR criterion is more relevant for defining risk. Second, the SR premium is relatively 
unaffected by market fluctuations or changes in investor expectations. The correlation 
analysis between the different risk premia (see Table 6) reveals that the SR risk premia based 
on C1 and C2 are counter-cyclical, while the other risk premium tends to follow the market 
conjuncture. When the market is bullish, the C1 and C2 based NMR risk premia decrease: 
investors thus appear to be more concerned about social responsibility when the market is 
bearish.   
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Table 6 
Pearson correlation matrix of the risk premia 
This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients of the Market risk premium as well as the Fama and 
French based risk premia. *, **, *** respectively indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
rm_rf NMR1 SMB1 HML1 NMR2 SMB2 HML2 NMR3 SMB3 HML3 
rm_rf 1.00*** -.24*** .43*** .80*** -.13*** .39*** .80*** .13*** .32*** .77*** 
NMR1 -.24*** 1.00*** -.03 -.28*** .27*** .02 -.28*** -.18*** .00 -.35*** 
SMB1 .43*** -.03 1.00*** .50*** .02 .95*** .50*** -.21*** .96*** .48*** 
HML1 .80*** -.28*** .50*** 1.00*** -.21*** .44*** .99*** -.02 .40*** .98*** 
NMR2 -.13*** .27*** .02 -.21*** 1.00*** -.16*** -.21*** .27*** .02 -.24*** 
SMB2 .39*** .02 .95*** .44*** -.16*** 1.00 .44*** -.24*** .95*** .43*** 
HML2 .80*** -.28*** .50*** .99*** -.21*** .44*** 1.00*** -.02 .39*** .98*** 
NMR3 .13*** -.18*** -.21*** -.02 .27*** -.24*** -.02 1.00*** -.27*** -.02 
SMB3 .32*** .00 .96*** .40*** .02 .95*** .39*** -.27*** 1.00*** .41*** 
HML3 .77*** -.35*** .48*** .98*** -.24*** .43*** .98*** -.02 .41*** 1.00*** 
 
 3.2 SR-augmented Fama and French regressions 
In this subsection we carry out an empirical analysis that aims at considering additional risk 
premia in the Fama and French (1993) model. Our objective is to analyze the impact of the 
three SR risk premia on financial performance.  
We run the following empirical model, inspired by Fama and French (1993) for the 54 
portfolios constructed previously (see the beginning of this section). 
,
, , , ,
( ) 1 2 3
P tP t f t P M t f t P t P t P t P t P tR r R r s SMB h HML e NMR f NMR g NMRα β− = + − + + + + +  
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Where 
,P tR  is the return of portfolio P (one of the 54 constructed portfolios) on month t, ,M tR  
is the return of the market portfolio on month t, tSMB  is the return of the “Small Minus Big 
size” Fama and French portfolio, tHML  is the return of the “High Minus Low BTM” Fama 
and French portfolio, and NMR1, NMR2, NMR3 are the three SR-based portfolios 
constructed at the beginning of Section 3. 
 
3.2.1 Regression results 
Table 7 presents the results for the 18 portfolios based on the first component (C1) of social 
performance (see Panel A), the 18 portfolios based on the second component (C2) of social 
performance (see Panel B), and the 18 portfolios based on the third component (C3) of social 
performance (see Panel C). 
Adding the NMR1, NMR2 and NMR3 risk premia to the traditional Fama and French (1993) 
specification (only based on the market, SMB and HML risk premia) allows increasing the 
adjusted R² by approximately 2.48%. The average adjusted R² of the SR-augmented Fama and 
French (1993) regression (i.e. the regression including the NMR1, NMR2 and NMR3 risk 
premia) is about 84.54%. 
When we analyze the coefficient significance at the 10% level, we note that the NMR1 
coefficient is significant for 8 portfolios out of 18, the NMR2 coefficient is significant for 12 
portfolios out of 18, and the NMR3 coefficient is significant for 13 out of 18 portfolios. 
Table 7  Panel A 
Results for the 18 portfolios based on the first component of social performance 
This table presents the NMR1 coefficient as well as the adjusted R² and its variation when adding the NMR1, 
NMR2 and NMR3 risk premia in a traditional Fama and French (1993) specification (based only on market, 
SMB and HML risk premia).  
portfolio based on C1 NMR1 
coefficient 
Standard 
Deviation Student t P-value 
Adjusted 
R² 
R² 
variation 
SLN 1.100 .179 6.146 .000 93.85% 3.93% 
SLI .245 .235 1.042 .301 85.31% 0.17% 
SLE -.555 .205 -2.708 .008 93.16% 1.44% 
SMN .623 .160 3.882 .000 85.06% 2.69% 
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SMI .037 .136 .275 .784 91.56% -0.24% 
SME -.699 .172 -4.072 .000 86.26% 2.80% 
SHN .789 .122 6.495 .000 91.75% 7.19% 
SHI .268 .178 1.508 .136 77.36% 0.83% 
SHE -.232 .175 -1.329 .188 75.14% 0.88% 
BHN .793 .209 3.784 .000 80.75% 4.17% 
BHI -.186 .175 -1.058 .293 93.34% 0.99% 
BHE .052 .127 .407 .685 96.52% 0.51% 
BMN .446 .216 2.066 .042 72.13% 1.69% 
BMI .031 .166 .188 .851 82.88% 2.05% 
BME -.028 .127 -.218 .828 87.28% 0.16% 
BLN .513 .170 3.025 .003 64.27% 7.49% 
BLI -.016 .159 -.101 .920 64.88% 1.78% 
BLE -.001 .131 -.010 .992 74.94% 0.81% 
 
 Table 7  Panel B 
Results for the 18 portfolios based on the second component of social 
performance 
This table presents the NMR2 coefficient as well as the adjusted R² and its variation when adding the NMR1, 
NMR2 and NMR3 risk premia in a traditional Fama and French (1993) specification (based only on market, 
SMB and HML risk premia).  
portfolio based on C2 NMR2 
coefficient 
Standard 
Deviation Student t P-value 
Adjusted 
R² 
R² 
variation 
SLN .455 .213 2.135 .036 90.71% 0.61% 
SLI .610 .138 4.408 .000 95.60% 1.75% 
SLE -.809 .191 -4.238 .000 95.30% 1.68% 
SMN .503 .137 3.664 .000 91.63% 1.33% 
SMI .161 .158 1.019 .311 87.94% -0.16% 
SME -.180 .223 -.808 .422 82.29% 0.02% 
SHN .623 .149 4.170 .000 86.12% 5.73% 
SHI .554 .143 3.869 .000 88.15% 4.87% 
SHE -.549 .189 -2.900 .005 77.89% 2.54% 
BHN .578 .186 3.101 .003 90.86% 1.53% 
BHI .516 .155 3.333 .001 93.02% 0.75% 
BHE -.430 .155 -2.771 .007 94.29% 1.85% 
BMN .659 .203 3.250 .002 78.91% 4.82% 
BMI -.004 .129 -.034 .973 90.62% 0.09% 
BME .024 .177 .138 .890 78.77% -0.48% 
BLN .669 .190 3.522 .001 74.75% 5.94% 
BLI -.230 .142 -1.619 .110 67.26% 2.39% 
BLE -.089 .156 -.568 .572 70.71% 4.25% 
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Table 7  Panel C 
Results for the 18 portfolios based on the third component of social performance 
This table presents the NMR3 coefficient as well as the adjusted R² and its variation when adding the NMR1, 
NMR2 and NMR3 risk premia in a traditional Fama and French (1993) specification (based only on market, 
SMB and HML risk premia).  
portfolio based on C3 NMR3 
coefficient 
Standard 
Deviation Student t P-value  
Adjusted 
R² R² variation 
SLN .476 .195 2.437 .017  84.59% 1.76% 
SLI -.087 .167 -.523 .602  91.58% 0.67% 
SLE -.781 .124 -6.293 .000  94.34% 4.77% 
SMN .158 .112 1.407 .163  89.59% 0.17% 
SMI .199 .105 1.899 .061  90.54% 0.21% 
SME -.575 .180 -3.187 .002  78.03% 2.07% 
SHN .359 .123 2.927 .004  85.13% 1.60% 
SHI -.050 .109 -.461 .646  85.81% 1.39% 
SHE -.814 .111 -7.344 .000  86.88% 12.09% 
BHN .354 .099 3.568 .001  94.01% 1.94% 
BHI -.204 .103 -1.990 .050  95.59% 0.20% 
BHE -.775 .121 -6.382 .000  94.36% 3.55% 
BMN .357 .121 2.956 .004  84.09% 1.55% 
BMI -.011 .096 -.116 .908  87.66% -0.09% 
BME -.482 .141 -3.425 .001  79.61% 3.31% 
BLN .340 .141 2.417 .018  69.72% 2.66% 
BLI -.166 .106 -1.564 .122  67.00% 2.96% 
BLE -.669 .112 -5.979 .000  75.61% 14.42% 
 
 
3.2.2 Link between portfolio SR ratings and their NMR sensitivity  
Table 8 presents the average factor loadings of the NMR1, NMR2 and NMR3 risk premium 
in the SR-augmented Fama-French regression. The factor loadings are aggregated depending 
on the SR commitment of the portfolios. The first column of Table 8 presents the average 
factor loadings for the portfolios based on the first component of SR performance (C1). The 
first (and respectively second and third) row concern the average factor loadings for the six 
less (respectively in-between, and more) SR portfolios.  The second column of Table 8 
presents the average factor loadings for the portfolios based on the second component of SR 
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performance. Finally, the third column of Table 8 presents the average factor loadings for the 
portfolios based on the third component of SR performance. 
As expected, we observe that the non-SR portfolios are positively linked to the NMR risk 
premia. The average factor loading decreases when the portfolios’ SR commitment increases. 
Finally, the SR portfolios show a negative sensitivity to the NMR risk premia.  
 
Table 8  
Average factor loadings for the portfolios based on the three components of SR 
performance  
The first column of this table presents the average factor loadings for the portfolios based on the first component 
of SR performance (C1). The first (respectively second, and third) row concern the average factor loadings for 
the six less (respectively in-between, most) SR portfolios.  The second (respectively third) column presents the 
average factor loadings for the portfolios based on the second (respectively third) component of SR performance. 
 
 NMR1 NMR2 NMR3 
Non SR  .711 .581 .341 
In-between  .063 .268 -.053 
SR  
-.244 -.339 -.683 
 
 
Table 8 presents average factor loadings. To see whether for each portfolio based on size and 
book-to-market groups, the coefficient of the Non-SR portfolio is higher than the coefficient 
of the SR corresponding portfolio, we propose illustrating these coefficients in Figure 2.  
Figure 2, Panel A (respectively Panel B and C) graphs the sensitivity to the NMR1 
(respectively NMR2 and NMR3) risk premium of the 6 non-SR portfolios, the 6 In-between 
portfolios, and the 6 SR portfolios. We clearly see that the blue line is always above the green 
line and that the two lines never cross. This indicates that, for each portfolio based on size and 
book-to-market deciles, the sensitivity of the non-SR portfolio (to the NMR risk premium) is 
higher than the sensitivity of the corresponding SR portfolio. 
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Figure 2  Panel A 
This Figure illustrates the sensitivity to the NMR1 risk premium  
of the 6 non-SR portfolios, the 6 In-between portfolios, and the  
6 SR portfolios based on the first SR component (C1). 
 
 
Figure 2 Panel B 
This Figure illustrates the sensitivity to the NMR2 risk premium 
of the 6 non-SR portfolios, the 6 In-between portfolios, and the 
6 SR portfolios based on the second SR component (C2). 
 
Figure 2 Panel C 
This Figure illustrates the sensitivity to the NMR3 risk premium 
of the 6 non-SR portfolios, the 6 In-between portfolios, and the 
6 SR portfolios based on the third SR component (C3). 
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We observe in Table 8 and Figure 2 that the sensitivity to the first factor (direct non financial 
stakeholders), NMR1, is larger for non SR portfolios. The R2 variation and the student t 
associated with the SR factor loading are greater for these portfolios. As far as direct non 
financial stakeholders are concerned, it seems that investors claim a penalty for the least 
socially responsible firms rather than rewarding the more SR firms. The risk is concentrated 
on the worst non SR firm behaviors regarding employees, customers and suppliers. On the 
contrary, for the third factor linked to corporate governance, NMR3, the distinctive behavior 
is for the most SR firms.SR portfolios appear different from others, with negative 
sensitivities. SR firms benefit from a discount thanks to their good practices in maintaining 
links with their financial stakeholders: investors are more confident in their relationship with 
these firms and this is reflected in the required rate of return.  
To deepen our understanding of the link between each portfolio’s NMR coefficient and its SR 
level, we carry out a regression analysis. More precisely, we perform the following regression 
of the portfolios’ NMR coefficient on the SR level, size level, and book-to-market level of 
portfolios: 
0 1 2 3_ _ _NMR Size level BTM level SR levelβ α α α α= + + +    
Where NMRβ  is the portfolios’ NMR coefficient. _Size level  takes the value of -1 for small 
size levels and the value of 1 for large size levels. _BTM level  takes the value of -1 for low 
book-to-market levels, 0 for in-between levels and 1 for high book-to-market levels. Finally, 
_SR level  takes the value of -1 for low levels of social responsibility, 0 for in-between levels 
and 1 for high levels of social responsibility. 
Performing this regression for our 54 values of NMRβ  gives the results presented in Table 9. As 
expected, we find that NMRβ  is significantly and negatively linked to the SR level of portfolios.  
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Table 9 
Link between portfolio NMR coefficients and their SR level 
This table presents the results of the following regression: 
0 1 2 3_ _ _NMR Size level BTM level SR levelβ α α α α= + + +
 
NMRβ  is the  NMR coefficient of the portfolios. _Size level  can take the value of -1 for small  size levels and the 
value of 1 for large size levels. _BTM level  can take the value of -1 for low book-to-market levels, 0 for in-
between levels and 1 for high book-to-market levels. _SR level  can take the value of -1 for low levels of 
social responsibility, 0 for in-between levels and 1 for high levels of social responsibility. 
variable coefficient Standard Deviation Student t P-value Adjusted R² 
(Constant) ,011 ,025 ,461 ,645 
14,6% 
Size_level ,000 
,025 -,008 ,993 
BTM_level ,000 ,030 ,017 ,987 
SR_level -,166 ,030 -5,533 ,000 
 
 
Conclusion 
Social and environmental ratings provided by social rating agencies are multidimensional. While the 
first papers exploring the link between social scores and financial performance mainly used a unique, 
global score, recent studies try to highlight the relations between stock returns - or equity market 
values - and sub-ratings. The literature is mixed and provides no certainty about these links. In a 
previous article based on Vigeo global social scores, Dupré et al., 2006 showed that highly rated 
European firms used to experience a lower cost of equity. Vigeo rates firms on six dimensions, 
providing six sub-ratings. We contribute to a better understanding of the relation between the different 
dimensions of social responsibility thanks to an exploratory analysis of the sub-ratings. A principal 
component analysis of the six dimensions shows that firms distinguish three independent targets in 
their SR policy: direct non financial stakeholders (employees, customers and suppliers), indirect 
stakeholders (environment and society) and financial stakeholders (stockholders and debt holders). 
Consequently, each firm can be represented by three orthogonal sub-scores. If we rank separately the 
firms according to each of these scores, it appears that the difference between risk-adjusted returns on 
portfolios with low and high-rated firms is positive, regardless the sub-score. This difference 
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constitutes a risk premium required for non SR firms. The three average SR risk premia are 
significantly positive. They are higher for the first and third components (“direct non financial 
stakeholders” and “financial stakeholders”) than for the second component (“indirect stakeholders”). 
The SR component risk premia for the first two components increase regularly from the beginning of 
the period, while the increase of the third is obvious only from the end of 2008. Financial investors 
first focused their SR concern on the way firms manage their relationship with direct stakeholders. 
More recently, environmental and community involvement have become  risk factors in investors’ 
minds. When adding the non-socially responsible risk premia to a Fama and French three factor 
model, sensitivity to the social factor of portfolios with different levels of social commitment exhibits 
the expected pattern. We show sensitivity decreases with social score. Regarding employees, 
customers and suppliers, we also show that risk is concentrated on the worst non SR firms. On 
the contrary, for the third factor linked to corporate governance, the gap is between SR 
portfolios and others: SR firms benefit from a discount thanks to their good practices in 
corporate governance.   
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Appendix 1: Vigeo’s Social Rating Methodology 
Vigeo evaluates social responsibility and not ethics. This agency evaluates a firm’s 
managerial engagement to take into account and report the rights and interests of all the firms’ 
stakeholders. The ratings are established following criteria and fields of social responsibility 
based on a reference framework. This framework is based on the best practices recommended 
by international organizations such as the UN, ILO and OECD.  More precisely, Vigeo rates 
six criteria for social responsibility: “Human Resources”, “Environment”, “Corporate 
Governance”, “Community Involvement”, “Business Behavior”, and “Human Rights”.  
Vigeo defines the six considered criteria as follows (see Vigeo website):  
1. Human Resources: Continuous improvement of professional relations, labor relations and 
working conditions. 
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2. Environment: Protection, safeguarding, prevention of damage to the environment, 
implementation of an adequate management strategy, eco-design, protection of biodiversity 
and co-ordinated management of environmental impacts on the entire lifecycle of products or 
services. 
3. Corporate Governance: Effectiveness and integrity, guarantee of independence and 
efficiency of the Board of Directors, effectiveness and efficiency of auditing and control 
mechanisms, in particular the inclusion of social responsibility risks, respect for the rights of 
shareholders, particularly minority shareholders, transparency and rationale for the 
remuneration of directors. 
4. Community Involvement: Effectiveness, managerial commitment to community 
involvement, contribution to the economic and social development of territories / societies 
within which the company operates, positive commitment to manage the social impact linked 
to products or services and overt contribution and participation in causes of public or general 
interest. 
5. Business Behavior: Consideration of the rights and interests of clients, integration of social 
and environmental standards in the selection of suppliers and on the entire supply chain, 
effective prevention of corruption and respect for competitive practices. 
6. Human Rights in the Workplace: Respect for freedom of association, the right to collective 
bargaining, non-discrimination and promotion of equality, elimination of illegal working 
practices such as child or forced labor, prevention of inhumane or degrading treatment such as 
sexual harassment, protection of privacy and personal data. 
A more precise definition of these criteria is available on Vigeo’s website: 
http://www.vigeo.fr/.  
Our Methodology for constructing a single rating based on the six Vigeo ratings. 
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The six ratings HRn  (“Human Resources”), ENVn  (“Environment” ), CGn  (“Corporate 
Governance”), CINn  (“Community Involvement”), BBn  (“Business Behavior”), and HRtsn  
(“Human Rights”), given to a company by Vigeo are integers between 0 and 4.  
Based on these six integers, we follow the same methodology as that used for constructing the 
ASPI index. We create a global rating n such that: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1HR ENV CG CI BB HuRin n n n n n n= + + + + + + −  
 
 
Appendix 2: Evolution of the NMR premium for each sub-rating  
We present the Figures representing the evolution of the NMR risk premia for each sub-rating 
produced by Vigeo. The six figures plot the NMR value, i.e. the difference between the 
cumulative return of the least ethical firms and of the most ethical ones. 
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